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Hypothetical Choice,
Egalitarianism and the
Separateness of Persons
KEITH HYAMS
University of Warwick
Luck egalitarians claim that disadvantage is worse when it emerges from an unchosen
risk than when it emerges from a chosen risk. I argue that disadvantage is also worse
when it emerges froman unchosen risk that the disadvantaged agentwould have declined
to take, had he or she been able to do so, than when it emerges from an unchosen risk
that the disadvantaged agent would not have declined to take. Such a view is significant
because it allows both luck egalitarians and prioritarians to respond to Voorhoeve and
Fleurbaey’s charge that they fail to accommodate intuitions about the moral relevance of
interpersonal boundaries – the so-called separateness of persons objection. I argue that
the view is plausible independently of its ability to answer the separateness of persons
objection, and is a natural extension of the luck egalitarian concern with the impact of
unchosen circumstance.
I. INTRODUCTION
The separateness of persons objection claims that certain ethical
views disregard intuitions about the moral relevance of interpersonal
boundaries. Utilitarians have long been charged with such a failing.
More recently, Otsuka and Voorhoeve have charged that prioritarians,
those who think that, in Parfit’s words, ‘benefiting people matters more
the worse off these people are’, are also vulnerable to the objection.1
In yet a further deployment of the objection, Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey
now charge that a third view is also guilty of failing to accommodate
intuitions about the moral relevance of interpersonal boundaries.2
That view is brute luck egalitarianism, the recently popular view that
disadvantage – by which is meant comparative disadvantage – that is
the result of unchosen circumstance, is worse than disadvantage that
is not the result of unchosen circumstance.3
1 M. Otsuka and A. Voorhoeve, ‘Why It Matters That Some Are Worse Off Than
Others: An Argument Against the Priority View’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 37 (2009),
pp. 171–99; D. Parfit, ‘Equality and Priority’, Ratio 10 (1997), pp. 202–21.
2 A. Voorhoeve and M. Fleurbaey, ‘Egalitarianism and the Separateness of Persons’,
Utilitas 24 (2012), pp. 381–98.
3 Although the term ‘luck egalitarianism’ is more commonly used, some authors have
begun to refer to ‘brute luck egalitarianism’ in order to clarify that unchosen luck, rather
c© Cambridge University Press 2015. This is an Open Access article, distributed under
the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/3.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Utilitas Vol. 27, No. 2, June
2015
doi:10.1017/S0953820814000363
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Several authors have replied to the separateness of persons objection
on behalf of prioritarianism.4 To my knowledge, no one has yet replied
to the objection on behalf of brute luck egalitarianism. In what
follows I offer such a response, by describing a version of brute luck
egalitarianism that does not encounter the separateness of persons
objection. As I explain, we can also describe a prioritarian variant of the
view, thereby offering prioritarians another way to avoid the objection.
Both positions are interesting not only in so far as they provide answers
to the separateness of persons objection, but also because they help
us to achieve a clearer understanding of how we should evaluate the
badness of any given disadvantage, and how we should make deontic
recommendations on the basis of those evaluations.
The article begins by setting out Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey’s
charge that brute luck egalitarianism cannot accommodate intuitions
about the separateness of persons, and by discussing some possible
egalitarian responses to the charge. I then describe a new version of
brute luck egalitarianism (and its prioritarian relation) that is sensitive
to hypothetical choices about risk, and I explain the independent appeal
of such a view. I show how the stated view is able to answer the
separateness of persons objection, and I discuss whether the viewmight
need to be modified to accommodate cases involving children.
II. THE SEPARATENESS OF PERSONS OBJECTION
Why might brute luck egalitarians appear vulnerable to the sepa-
rateness of persons objection? Before answering this question, it will
help, first, to clarify the nature of the charge, by distinguishing three
different ways in which a particular moral view might be thought
than chosen luck, is the primary object of egalitarian concern. More recent versions of
brute luck egalitarianism include the qualification that particular background conditions
must be satisfied in order for choice to render disadvantage less bad than it would
otherwise have been, such as the requirement that there was a reasonable alternative to
the chosen option. The presence of such a qualification can be assumed in what follows,
andmakes no difference to the overall argument. Note also that, for clarity’s sake, I frame
brute luck egalitarianism in the present article mostly in telic terms, that is, as a view
concerned with the badness or unfairness of disadvantage. Brute luck egalitarianism
can, however, be recast in deontic terms, as a view about how one ought to act in order to
avoid bringing about unjust disadvantage. The present arguments would apply in equal
measure to such a view. For the distinction between telic and deontic egalitarianism, see
Parfit, ‘Equality or Priority’.
4 R. Crisp, ‘In Defence of the Priority View: A Response to Otsuka and Voorhoeve’,
Utilitas 23 (2011), pp. 105–8; A. Williams, ‘The Priority View Bites the Dust?’, Utilitas
24 (2012), pp. 315–31; M. O’Neill, ‘Priority, Preference, and Value’, Utilitas 24 (2012),
pp. 332–48; T. Porter, ‘In Defence of the Priority View’, Utilitas 24 (2012), pp. 349–64; D.
Parfit, ‘Another Defence of the Priority View’,Utilitas 24 (2012), pp. 399–440; G. Bognar,
‘Empirical and Armchair Ethics’,Utilitas 24 (2012), pp. 467–82; M. Rendall, ‘Priority and
Desert’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2013), pp. 939–51.
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to disregard intuitions about the moral relevance of interpersonal
boundaries.5
According to the first interpretation of the separateness of persons
objection, the objection is that a particular moral view is problematic
because it resolves interpersonal conflicts in a way that is intuitively
impermissible, by virtue of its ignoring intuitions about the moral
relevance of interpersonal boundaries. Utilitarianism, for example,
confronts the first version of the objection when it recommends giving
a resource to a well-off agent over a badly-off agent on the sole ground
that the well-off agent will derive slightly more benefit from the
resource than the badly-off agent. The second interpretation claims
that a particular moral view is objectionable because it is indifferent
between alternative possible distributive outcomes when, according to
intuition, we ought to prefer one outcome over another for reasons
that have to do with the moral relevance of interpersonal boundaries.
Utilitarianism confronts this version of the objection when it expresses
indifference whether a resource be given to a badly-off agent or a well-
off agent, both of whom will derive the same amount of benefit from
the resource. The third interpretation of the objection, which unlike the
first two interpretations focuses on the justification for a view rather
than the view itself, claims that the justification for a particular moral
view is objectionable because it implausibly extends an intrapersonal
principle to the resolution of interpersonal conflicts. Utilitarianism
confronts the third version of the objection if it looks to an intrapersonal
principle to justify its claim that we should maximize expected utility
in interpersonal cases, as in Mill’s famous ‘proof’ of utilitarianism: ‘that
each person’s happiness is a good to that person, and that the general
happiness, therefore, is a good to the aggregate of all persons’.6
In what follows I shall respond to the charge that brute luck
egalitarianism is vulnerable to the first of the above versions of
the separateness of persons objection. I focus on the first version
of the objection for two reasons. First, because Voorhoeve and
Fleurbaey’s examples, as described below, are most readily interpreted
as illustrations of this version of the objection. Second, because
this is the version that appears to pose the strongest prima facie
threat to brute luck egalitarianism. Unlike utilitarianism, brute luck
5 I do not insist that these three interpretations of the objection exhaust the possible
ways in which a view might fail to be sensitive to the moral relevance of interpersonal
boundaries. Nor do I mention ways in which each of the three interpretations identified
might be further subdivided. For further discussion of different versions of the
separateness of persons objection as applied to prioritarianism, see Porter, ‘In Defence of
the Priority View’; M. Otsuka, ‘Prioritarianism and the Separateness of Persons’,Utilitas
24 (2012), pp. 365–80.
6 J. S. Mill (1861), Utilitarianism, ed. R. Crisp (Oxford, 1998), p. 81.
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egalitarianism endorses a principle that is anything but indifferent
between possible distributive outcomes, at least in ways that concern
the moral relevance of interpersonal boundaries.7 Nor does brute
luck egalitarianism look to an intrapersonal principle to justify its
commitment to equality at the interpersonal level.
Consider, then, Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey’s argument for their claim
that brute luck egalitarianism is vulnerable to the separateness
of persons objection. Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey ask us to imagine
the following two scenarios. In the first scenario, the Two-Person
Intrapersonal case, there are two children, Albert and Bob, both of
whom are visually impaired but not blind.8 You, a morally motivated
stranger, must decide whether or not to intervene in an unpredictable
natural course of events that, if left to run its course, will affect Albert’s
sight. If you do intervene, Albert’s visual impairment will remain
unchanged. But if you do not intervene, there is a 50 per cent chance
that Albert will become fully sighted and a 50 per cent chance that
his visual impairment will become worse. Bob’s visual impairment will
remain unchanged whether or not you intervene. The loss of utility
that Albert would experience if his visual impairment is made worse
by the natural course of events – l in the table below – is sufficiently
small that the possible gain in utility to Albert just outweighs both
the possible loss of utility to Albert and the badness (if any) of the
inequality between Albert and Bob that will result from Albert’s being
made better or worse off than Bob by the natural course of events.9 It
is therefore just permissible not to intervene in the natural course of
events and so to leave Albert exposed to the risk.
The second scenario is Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey’s Two-Person
Interpersonal case. In this scenario, everything is the same as in the
Two-Person Intrapersonal case, except that the possible outcomes of
the natural course of events are slightly different. There is now a 50
7 Cf. D. McKerlie, ‘Egalitarianism and the Difference between Intrapersonal and
Interpersonal Judgments’, Egalitarianism: New Essays on the Nature and Value of
Equality, ed. N. Holtug and K. Lippert-Rasmussen (Oxford, 2006), pp. 157–73, at 158, n.
2.
8 Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey assume that Albert and Bob are children in order to set
aside autonomy-based explanations of how you ought to choose. See section VI below.
9 This is possible only if the badness of disadvantage is not so great that it outweighs
the benefit of any possible gain. But as Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey (‘Egalitarianism and
the Separateness of Persons’, p. 390) note, even if this assumption does not hold, we can
still frame the problem in terms of brute luck egalitarianism’s apparent failure to explain
why there are stronger reasons to opt for non-intervention in the intrapersonal case than
in the interpersonal case, even if all things considered we should opt for intervention
in both cases. Note also that I follow Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey in making no particular
assumptions about how utility ought to be measured, except that the measure of utility
does not take into account any interest that agents may have in the fairness of the
distributive process itself, or in the fairness of the distributive outcomes that it yields.
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Table 1. Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey’s Two Person Intrapersonal
Trade-off Case and Two Person Interpersonal Trade-off Case
State of the world (equiprobable)
Alternative Person s1 s2
Two Person Intrapersonal Trade-off Case
Non-intervention Albert 1 0.8 − l
Bob 0.8 0.8
Intervention Albert 0.8 0.8
Bob 0.8 0.8
Two Person Interpersonal Trade-off Case
Non-intervention Albert 0.8 0.8 − l
Bob 1 0.8
Intervention Albert 0.8 0.8
Bob 0.8 0.8
per cent chance that the natural course of events will cause Bob to
become fully sighted whilst having no effect on Albert, and a 50 per
cent chance that the natural course of events will cause Albert’s visual
impairment to become worse whilst leaving Bob unaffected. In each of
the two scenarios described, the size of the possible gains and losses in
utility are identical, as in table 1.
Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey claim, quite plausibly, that there is a much
weaker intuitive case in favour of non-intervention in the interpersonal
case than in the intrapersonal case. In the intrapersonal case, they
note that you may justify exposing Albert to the risk of having his
sight worsened by appealing to the benefit that Albert would enjoy if
he instead ended up fully sighted. But in the interpersonal case, the
possible benefits are benefits to Bob, not to Albert, and as such provide
a much weaker justification for not intervening and leaving Albert
exposed to the risk of having his sight worsened. The possible loss to
Albert of not intervening, which in the intrapersonal casewas just small
enough to be outweighed by the possible benefits to Albert, is therefore
too large to be outweighed in the interpersonal case by the possible
benefit to Bob. More generally, Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey claim, there
is an intuitive ‘shift in the moral weight of changes in utility between
intrapersonal and interpersonal trade-offs’.10 This shift, they suggest,
reflects the difference played in our moral thinking between the unity
of the individual and the separateness of persons.
Like the examples featuring in an earlier, more widely discussed
article by Otsuka and Voorhoeve, Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey’s examples
10 Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey, ‘Egalitarianism and the Separateness of Persons’, p. 383.
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provide further illustration of the difficulties that both utilitarians and
prioritarians face when trying to accommodate intuitions about the
separateness of persons. Both views, as characterized by Voorhoeve and
Fleurbaey, mistakenly see an equally strong case for non-intervention
in both scenarios. Utilitarians, who value options in proportion to the
amount of utility expectably generated by that option, see an equally
strong case, because the total expected utility of non-intervention is
the same in each scenario. In each scenario, non-intervention would
result in one child ending up with his visual impairment unchanged
(associated with a utility of 0.8) and either one child ending up fully
sighted (associated with a utility of 1) or (with an equal chance in
both cases) one child ending up with his visual impairment worsened
(associated with a utility of 0.8 − l). Prioritarians, claim Voorhoeve and
Fleurbaey, also fail to capture the difference in our intuitions about the
two cases. As characterized by Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey, on the basis
of Parfit’s original description of the view, prioritarians value options
in proportion to the amount of priority-weighted utility expectably
generated by each option, assigning greater value to losses in utility
lower down an absolute scale of utility.11 Since non-intervention is
expected to result in the same amount of priority-weighted utility in
both, such a view will see an equal case for non-intervention in both
cases.
The charge that neither utilitarianism nor prioritarianism can
accommodate the difference in our intuitive judgements about
intrapersonal cases and interpersonal cases has been widely discussed,
in response to Otsuka and Voorhoeve’s original statement of the
charge.12 Intriguingly, however, Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey’s example
suggests that it is not only utilitarians and prioritarians who are
vulnerable to the separateness of persons objection; rather, their
example goes beyond Otsuka and Voorhoeve’s original article in
suggesting that brute luck egalitarians are also vulnerable to the
objection. To see why it does so, recall that brute luck egalitarians
believe that disadvantage that is the result of unchosen circumstance
(so-called ‘brute luck disadvantage’) is worse than disadvantage that
is not the result of unchosen circumstance (so-called ‘option luck
11 Parfit, in ‘Another Defence of the Priority View’, now endorses an alternative
version of prioritarianism, which pays attention both to the priority-weighted value of
individuals’ utility outcomes, and to the priority-weighted value of individuals’ expected
utilities. This new version of prioritarianism does not encounter the separateness of
persons objection, but is vulnerable to an alternative challenge along the lines of
that mentioned below in relation to ex ante egalitarianism: the charge that it relies
on a morally arbitrary distinction between changes to probability and eventuation of
outcomes.
12 See references in n. 4 above.
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disadvantage’). In Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey’s example, neither Albert
nor Bob have any say in your decision whether or not to intervene, and
are unable to intervene in the natural course of events themselves. As
such, Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey treat all the possible disadvantage in
the example as brute luck disadvantage. Moreover, non-intervention is
expected to result in the same amount of comparative disadvantage
in both the intrapersonal case and the interpersonal case. In both
cases, it is equally likely under non-intervention that either the visual
impairment of one child will remain unchanged whilst that of the other
child will become worse, or that the visual impairment of one child
will remain unchanged whilst the other child will become fully sighted.
Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey therefore charge that brute luck egalitarians,
like utilitarians and prioritarians, wrongly see as much reason to
opt for non-intervention in the interpersonal case as they see in the
intrapersonal case.
III. EGALITARIAN VIEWS THAT AVOID THE OBJECTION
In the next section I shall describe a way in which brute luck
egalitarians might develop their view in an independently plausible
direction, thereby avoiding the separateness of persons objection.13
I shall suggest that prioritarians might also develop their view in a
similar direction in order to avoid the objection. Before I do so, however,
I shall first, in the present section, outline three alternative egalitarian
responses to the objection, in order to assess their strengths and
weaknesses vis-a`-vis the response that I recommend in the remainder
of the article.
First, as Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey themselves note, the separateness
of persons objection is not faced by an egalitarian view that treats the
badness of outcome inequality as a function not only of the degree of
outcome inequality itself, but also of the degree of ex ante inequality
in the distribution of chances that obtained prior to the outcome
eventuating. Since non-intervention renders Albert and Bob more ex
ante unequal in Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey’s interpersonal case than it
does in Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey’s intrapersonal case, the ex ante view
13 It has become something of a joke to refer to the exponential growth in versions
of brute luck egalitarianism in recent years (J. Waldron, ‘Political Political Theory:
An Inaugural Lecture’, Journal of Political Philosophy 21 (2013), pp. 1–23, at 21,
colourfully compares them to Heinz 57 varieties), betraying the impatience of brute
luck egalitarianism’s detractors with the energy invested in debates internal to the view
that do not speak to outside concerns about the plausibility of the view in any form.
Nevertheless, whatever the value of such efforts, the present development does speak to
those concerns, since it responds to a powerful external challenge to the plausibility of
brute luck egalitarianism as a whole, showing that there is at least one plausible version
of the view that is immune to that challenge.
224 Keith Hyams
provides an obvious explanation why we should choose differently in
the two cases, by appeal to the bearing of the different degrees of ex ante
inequality under non-intervention on the badness of the disadvantage
that would result from non-intervention in each case. Moreover, such
a view has a certain amount of independent intuitive appeal. It has
been endorsed by, among others, Arneson, Broome and Temkin.14 On
the other hand, powerful doubts have been voiced about whether the
ex ante view correctly diagnoses the source of our intuitions about
the value of ex ante equality. Opponents of the view such as David
Wasserman suggest that ex ante equality is valuable only as a way to
ensure impartiality, and that a diagnosis of the value of ex ante equality
in such terms provides no grounds for treating unequal outcomes that
emerge from more ex ante equal distributions of chances as any less
bad, or the reason to avoid unequal outcomes as any less strong, than
unequal outcomes that emerge from less ex ante equal distributions of
chances.15 It is also questionable, as I argue elsewhere, whether the ex
ante view can accommodate intuitions about how we should respond to
information that changes our judgements about probability, in a way
that does not rely on a morally arbitrary distinction between changes
to probability and eventuation of outcomes.
A second egalitarian response to the separateness of persons
objection takes its lead from Andrew Williams’s suggestion that
prioritarians might respond to the objection by endorsing what he calls
a ‘restricted’ version of prioritarianism, which applies only to cases
involving interpersonal trade-offs. Along similar lines, one might think
that egalitarians could respond to the objection by supposing that
egalitarian considerations apply only when interpersonal trade-offs
are involved.16 Such a view may appeal, in particular, to egalitarians
who want to endorse the thought that, in the intrapersonal case, the
fact that Albert has a chance of becoming better off than Bob does
not provide any reason to intervene to preserve an equal outcome
in that case. The problem for egalitarians, however, is that they are
committed to measuring advantage and disadvantage in comparative
terms. Unlike prioritarians, egalitarians care not about how well off or
badly off agents are on some absolute scale, but about how unequally
well off agents are. As such, the Williams-inspired response, even
14 R. J. Arneson, ‘Postscript to “Equality andEqualOpportunity forWelfare” ’,Equality:
Selected Readings, ed. L. Pojman and R. Westmoreland (Oxford, 1997), pp. 229–42, at
238–41; J. Broome, ‘Fairness’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91 (1990), pp. 87–
101, at 95; L. Temkin, ‘Inequality: A Complex, Individualistic, and Comparative Notion’,
Philosophical Issues 11 (2001), pp. 327–53, at 338–9.
15 D. Wasserman, ‘Let Them Eat Chances: Probability and Distributive Justice’,
Economics and Philosophy 12 (2008), pp. 29–49.
16 I thank a referee for Utilitas for suggesting this response.
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if a legitimate response to the separateness of persons objection for
prioritarians, is simply not properly available to egalitarians. For on
a comparative measure of advantage and disadvantage, there is an
interpersonal trade-off to be made both in the intrapersonal case and in
the interpersonal case. In order to say that there is no trade-off in the
intrapersonal case, we would need to appeal to an absolute measure of
advantage, such that we can say that Bob’s level of absolute advantage
will be unaffected by our choice. But since egalitarians are concerned
with comparative measures of advantage, they cannot properly make
such an appeal, without sliding unjustifiably between absolute and
comparative measures of advantage. Instead, they must allow that,
even in the intrapersonal case, Bob’s level of comparative advantage
will be affected by your choice, because all of the possible outcomes of
non-intervention involve changes in both Albert’s and Bob’s levels of
comparative advantage.17
Finally, consider the novel egalitarian solution to the separateness
of persons objection suggested by Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey, and
previously discussed byOtsuka andVoorhoeve: the so-called ‘competing
claims view’. According to the competing claims view, we are to:
decide between alternatives by considering the comparative strength of the
claims of different individuals, where (i) a claim can be made on an individual’s
behalf if and only if his interests are at stake; and (ii) his claim to have a given
alternative chosen is stronger: (iia) the more his interests are promoted by
that alternative; and (iib) the worse off he is relative to others with whom his
interests conflict.18
The competing claims view can respond to the separateness of
persons objection by noting that, in the intrapersonal case, Albert
has a presumptive claim in favour of non-intervention, whereas Bob,
whose interests are not at stake, has no claim in favour of either
option. In the interpersonal case on the other hand, Bob’s claim in
favour of intervention is to be weighed against Albert’s claim against
intervention, and Albert’s potential loss in the interpersonal case
17 Even if this problem did not arise, one might further object on intuitive grounds
that it is quite implausible that the fact that Albert has a chance of becoming better
off than Bob does not provide any reason to intervene to preserve an equal outcome
in the intrapersonal case, even though it would provide a reason to intervene in an
otherwise identical modified case in which Bob will become ever so slightly better
off if you choose intervention rather than non-intervention. Why should such a small
difference in Bob’s prognoses between the original intrapersonal case and the modified
case make a disproportionately large difference to the bearing of Albert’s prognoses on
the permissibility of non-intervention?
18 Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey, ‘Egalitarianism and the Separateness of Persons’, p. 397.
See also Otsuka and Voorhoeve, ‘Why It Matters That Some Are Worse Off Than Others’,
pp. 183–4.
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acquires greater significance in this case because non-intervention will
leave Albert worse off than Bob no matter what happens.
One attraction of the competing claims view over some other
egalitarian responses to the separateness of persons objection is that
it answers the objection in a way that at the same time avoids
the levelling-down objection.19 But the significance of this virtue
will depend on the degree to which one is troubled by the levelling
down objection. Many egalitarians are not especially troubled by the
objection, since they are happy to allow that levelling down might be
in one way better than not levelling down, even though it will rarely
be permissible because of the damage that levelling down would do
to other values.20 The disadvantage of endorsing the competing claims
view as an egalitarian response to the separateness of persons objection
is that it remains unclear whether an account of this sort, which
links deontic decisions to the relative weight of claims of individual
agents, can provide a plausible account of how such claims are to be
aggregated, although recent progress in the direction of such an account
has certainly beenmade.21 Perhapsmore problematically still, however,
is the worry that the competing claims view provides no explanation
for intuitions about how we should act in non-identity cases, and that
to accommodate such cases we may need to appeal to the very sorts of
principles that the competing claims view seeks to replace.22
In the light of the difficulties faced by other egalitarian responses
to the separateness of persons objection, there is, then, every reason
to examine the merits of further possible solutions. It is in this spirit
that I argue in what follows that the hypothetical choice view provides
not only a persuasive egalitarian response to the separateness of
persons objection, but a view that ought to be appealing in its own
right. One major advantage of the hypothetical choice view is that it
avoids all of the foregoing objections to other egalitarian responses: it
neither makes contested claims about the value of ex ante equality, nor
slides inconsistently between comparative and absolute measures of
disadvantage, nor faces difficulties with aggregation and non-identity
cases. A drawback of the hypothetical choice view is that, unlike the
competing claims view, but in common with the ex ante view, it does
19 Parfit, ‘Equality and Priority’, pp. 210–11.
20 See M. O’Neill, ‘What Should Egalitarians Believe?’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 36
(2008), pp. 119–56, at 140–52.
21 For a recent discussion of the aggregation problem, which accommodates objections
to some existing views, see A. Voorhoeve, ‘How ShouldWeAggregate Competing Claims?’,
Ethics, forthcoming.
22 D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford, 1986), ch. 16; see also Otsuka,
‘Prioritarianism and the Separateness of Persons’. For a contractualist response, see
R. Kumar, ‘Who Can Be Wronged?’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (2003), pp. 99–118.
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not answer the levelling down objection. Nevertheless, as noted above,
many egalitarians will be content with a pluralist response to the
levelling down objection, and so will not regard this drawback as
especially significant. Moreover, although I describe the hypothetical
choice view in egalitarian terms, I note that prioritarians might also
endorse a version of their view according to which distributive decisions
ought to be sensitive to the hypothetical choices of agents affected by
them. A prioritarian version of the hypothetical choice view would face
neither the separateness of persons objection nor the levelling down
objection, and so ought to be attractive to those who are exercised by
both.
IV. THE HYPOTHETICAL CHOICE VIEW
Brute luck egalitarians believe that disadvantage that is the result of
unchosen circumstance is worse than disadvantage that is the result of
choice. There is, however, another strand to early statements of brute
luck egalitarianism, according to which hypothetical choices about risk
ought also to bear on the evaluation of disadvantage, even in the
absence of actual choice. Most notably, Dworkin’s ‘equality of resources’
view – often taken as the first statement of brute luck egalitarianism,
despite Dworkin’s protests that he was not a luck egalitarian – held
that those who develop handicaps should be compensated to the extent
that the average person would have chosen to insure against such an
eventuality.23 Even Cohen, to whom the now dominant focus on actual
choice can largely be traced, accepted that hypothetical choice may
have an important role to play in the evaluation of disadvantage.24
More broadly, of course, some of the most important figures in the
recent and not-so-recent history of political thought – Rawls, Nozick
and Rousseau, to name a few – have thought that hypothetical choice
can do powerful normative work.25
I shall argue that brute luck egalitarians can avoid the separateness
of persons objection if they endorse the view that, all other things being
equal, disadvantage is worse when it results from a risk that the agent
affected was unable to decline but would have declined if he had been
able to do so, compared to disadvantage that does not result from such
23 For example, R. M. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality
(Cambridge, Mass., 2002), pp. 78–9, and R. M. Dworkin, ‘Sovereign Virtue Revisited’,
Ethics 113 (2002), pp. 106–43, at 109–11.
24 G. A. Cohen, ‘On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice’, Ethics 99 (1989), pp. 906–44,
at 937–8.
25 J. Rawls,A Theory of Justice, rev. edn. (Cambridge, Mass., 1999); R. Nozick,Anarchy,
State, and Utopia (New York, 1974); J. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Other Later
Political Writings (Cambridge, 1997).
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a risk.26 Moreover, I shall argue that such a view is not ad hoc, but is,
rather, quite plausible for reasons independent of its ability to avoid the
separateness of persons objection. Call this view the hypothetical choice
view.27 Prioritarians could likewise develop their view in a similar
direction, thereby also avoiding the separateness of persons objection.
Whereas brute luck egalitarians read the hypothetical choice view as
referring to comparative disadvantage, prioritarians could endorse the
hypothetical choice view if they instead read it as referring to absolute
disadvantage. Prioritarians could then claim that we have stronger
reasons to choose an option to the extent that agents disadvantaged by
the option (in absolute terms) would not have declined to choose the
option, had they been able to do so, without at the same time endorsing
the claim made by hypothetical-choice brute luck egalitarianism that
these stronger reasons derive from judgements about the relative
badness of possible unequal outcomes.28 Nevertheless, for clarity, and
because, unlike prioritarians, brute luck egalitarians have not yet
responded to the separateness of persons objection, I frame the article
in terms of a brute luck egalitarian version of the hypothetical-choice
view.
Despite the limited use of hypothetical choice in early formulations
of brute luck egalitarianism, the hypothetical choice view nevertheless
26 As I noted above, actual choice luck egalitarians think that disadvantage that results
from choice can be as bad as disadvantage that results from unchosen luck if the choice
was not made against appropriate background conditions, such as in the presence of a
reasonable alternative. We might therefore extend the hypothetical choice view to say
that disadvantage is worse when it results from a risk that either the agent affected was
unable to decline and would have declined if he had been able to do so, or that the agent
chose in the absence of appropriate background conditions but would have declined had
the appropriate background conditions obtained, compared to disadvantage that does not
result from such a risk. The addition has no bearing on the present response to Voorhoeve
and Fleurbaey, however, since their example features agents who are straightforwardly
unable to choose for themselves whether to face a risk.
27 The hypothetical choice view of present interest is not the same as the view that
hypothetical choices render agents agent-responsible, in something like the sense that
an agent should be seen as the author of anything that he would have chosen. The latter
claim is the object of a powerful critique by S. L. Hurley, Justice, Luck, and Knowledge
(Cambridge, Mass., 2005), pp. 28–30. The two views are different, first, because the
view of present interest makes no claims about agent responsibility, but only about
the badness of disadvantage; second, because the present view is concerned only about
hypothetical choices about risks that in fact lead to actual disadvantage, whereas the
view that Hurley critiques claims that agents are agent responsible for both actual and
hypothetical outcomes that they would have chosen or chosen to risk, that is, regardless
of whether or not the outcome that they would have chosen or chosen to risk actually
eventuates.
28 Arneson has argued that prioritarians ought to be sensitive to responsibility and
choice, though he does not mention hypothetical choice in these articles (but see n.
34 below). R. J. Arneson, ‘Equality of Opportunity for Welfare Defended and Recanted’,
Journal of Political Philosophy, 7 (1999), pp. 488–97; R. J. Arneson, ‘Luck Egalitarianism
and Prioritarianism’, Ethics 110 (2000), pp. 339–49.
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amounts to a significant departure from currentlymainstream versions
of brute luck egalitarianism. There is some work to be done, then, to
show that the hypothetical choice view is notmerely an ad hoc technical
fix to the separateness of persons objection, but a view that ought to be
attractive to brute luck egalitarians for independent reasons.29
One way of arguing for the hypothetical choice view is simply to
show that it provides an accurate description of our intuitions about
test cases. In order to develop such an argument, consider the following
two scenarios, both of which are versions of Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey’s
Two-Person Intrapersonal case. The pay-off matrices for the agents
featuring in each scenario are identical to that described in Voorhoeve
and Fleurbaey’s original case. The only difference is that Albert’s
attitude to risk varies across the scenarios. In scenario one, Albert
would not decline intervention if he were able to do so, whereas in
scenario two, Albert would decline intervention if he were able to do
so.30 Call the Albert of scenario one, whowould not decline intervention,
Cautious Albert, and the Albert of scenario two, who would decline
intervention, IncautiousAlbert. Suppose further that Bob, who features
both in scenario one and in scenario two and whose sight would remain
unaffected in both cases, has no preference between intervention and
non-intervention in either scenario. At the time the opportunity for
intervention arises, Cautious Albert and Incautious Albert are, for
reasons entirely beyond their control, neither able to convey their
preferences to you nor able to intervene in the natural course of
events themselves. Perhaps, for example, their voices are drowned
out by the roar of a passing aircraft. Suppose that, in ignorance of
both Cautious Albert’s and Incautious Albert’s preferences, you decide
29 The hypothetical choice view of present interest shares with the Dworkinian
hypothetical insurance view a focus on hypothetical choice, but nevertheless differs from
the Dworkinian view in that it does not apply a hypothetical insurance approach to risks
that agents would have faced behind a veil of ignorance. Rather, the hypothetical choice
view of present interest applies only to risks that agents actually confront in the real
world. As such, the present view avoids the ongoing dispute between those who charge
that the Dworkinian hypothetical insurance view can lead to implausibly inegalitarian
results, by virtue of facts about the things that agents in general would and wouldn’t
choose to insure against from behind a veil of ignorance, and those who deny that it does
so. See J. E. Roemer, ‘Equality of Talent’, Economics and Philosophy 1 (1985), pp. 151–88;
M. Fleurbaey, ‘Equality of Resources Revisited’, Ethics 113 (2002), pp. 82–105; Dworkin,
‘Sovereign Virtue Revisited’, pp. 129–36.
30 If one supposes – as Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey do not – that utility ought to be
measured in terms of rational preferences that satisfy the Von Neumann–Morgenstern
axioms, then it would be irrational of Albert to decline intervention. But even if Albert’s
hypothetical choice would be irrational, he might nevertheless be inclined so to choose,
and there is no reason why the hypothetical choice view should treat only ideally rational
hypothetical choices as relevant to the badness of disadvantage. Certainly actual-choice
brute luck egalitarianism does not standardly insist that choices must be ideally rational
in order to render disadvantage less bad than it would otherwise have been.
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neither to intervene in the natural course of events that poses a risk to
Cautious Albert, nor to intervene in the natural course of events that
poses a risk to Incautious Albert. As a result, when the two natural
courses of events unfold, Cautious Albert and Incautious Albert end
up suffering a worsening of their visual impairment. They are each
thereby disadvantaged by comparison with Bob.
According to the hypothetical choice view, the fact that Cautious
Albert would have declined the risk that led to his disadvantage,
whereas Incautious Albert would not have done so, means that the
disadvantage suffered by Incautious Albert is not as bad as the
disadvantage suffered by Cautious Albert. I think that this is right.
To draw out this intuition, suppose that you now learn that Incautious
Albert would have declined intervention whereas Cautious Albert
would not have done so. Suppose further that you also learn that one
dose of a new medicine is available, which you can use to restore
either Cautious Albert’s visual impairment or Incautious Albert’s
visual impairment to the state it was in before the natural course
of events caused it to worsen. It seems quite plausible that, with
nothing else to choose between the two, the fact that Cautious Albert
would have declined to face the risk whereas Incautious Albert would
not have declined to face the risk does provide a reason to give
the medicine to Cautious Albert rather than Incautious Albert. The
underlying ground for this intuition, one might reasonably conclude,
is that the disadvantage suffered by Cautious Albert is worse than
the disadvantage suffered by Incautious Albert. That the hypothetical
choice view supplies a ready explanation for the intuition is a point in
its favour over the other egalitarian responses canvassed in section III,
which do not provide any explanation for the stated intuition.
Against the preceding argument, one might object that there is
an alternative explanation of the intuition that you should give the
medicine to Cautious Albert rather than to Incautious Albert, which
makes no reference to a difference in the badness of Cautious Albert’s
and Incautious Albert’s disadvantage. The alternative explanation is
compatible with, albeit not supplied by, the other egalitarian responses
canvassed above.31 According to the alternative explanation, we ought
to give the medicine to Cautious Albert over Incautious Albert for the
following reason. Now that we know that Incautious Albert would have
declined intervention, we know that we chose exactly as Incautious
Albert would have wanted. On the other hand, now that we know that
Cautious Albert would not have declined intervention, we know that
we did not choose as Cautious Albert would have wanted. We may
31 I am grateful to a referee for Utilitas for suggesting this alternative explanation.
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further think that, had we known at the time that Cautious Albert
would not have declined intervention, then we would have been obliged
to choose intervention on his behalf. For it is plausible that the risk-
regarding preferences of agents make a difference to how we should
treat them because, for example, of autonomy-type reasons, or because
we should make decisions about other agents based, at least in part,
on a preference-based measure of utility.32 As such, we might conclude
that we are now obliged to do the next best thing for Cautious Albert,
which is to give him the medicine to restore his sight.
How successful is this alternative explanation of the intuition that
you should give the medicine to Cautious Albert rather than to
Incautious Albert? I am dubious about the general principle to which
the explanation appeals, namely, something like the principle that
‘if you would at some earlier time have been obliged to act contrary
to how you in fact acted, had you then known what you now know,
then all other things being equal you should now act so as to bring
about as close as possible a state of affairs to that which would have
emerged had you acted in accordance with the hypothetical obligation’.
But even if we were to accept a principle along these lines, the
suggested alternative explanation still faces a further problem. The
difficulty is that the alternative explanation cannot explain why you
should give the medicine to Cautious Albert over Incautious Albert
in a modified scenario, identical to the present one except that the
possibility of intervention – either by yourself or by anybody else – never
in fact existed. (Had the possibility of intervention existed, Cautious
Albert would have chosen it, whereas Incautious Albert would have
declined it.) Since the original explanation in terms of the badness of
disadvantage can accommodate both the original and themodified case,
we have reason to prefer it to the alternative explanation.
A second way to argue for the hypothetical choice view, which adds
strength to the intuitive case but does not depend on the intuitive
case, is to show that it is an accurate reflection of an underlying brute
luck egalitarian concern with the impact of unchosen circumstance.
One reason, perhaps, that brute luck egalitarians have tended to focus
on actual choice rather than hypothetical choice is that actual choice
appears more obviously to reflect this underlying concern. If we can
show that hypothetical choices ought also to bear on this underlying
concern, then such a finding should considerably enhance the appeal of
the hypothetical choice view to brute luck egalitarians.
To see how hypothetical choices can bear on an underlying concern
with the impact of unchosen circumstance, consider that there are
32 Cf. Williams, ‘The Priority View Bites the Dust?’, p. 320, n. 19. See section VI below
for discussion of whether such considerations matter in cases that involve children.
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two quite different ways of understanding the concern. One way
focuses exclusively on the actual causal sequence that leads from
the unchosen circumstance to the disadvantage: if the sequence is
sufficiently tight, and/or uninterrupted by some relevant exercise of
agency on the part of the disadvantaged agent (or, perhaps, some
wrongdoer), then the disadvantage is regarded as appropriately linked
to the unchosen circumstance. This way of understanding a concern
with the impact of unchosen circumstance does not provide grounds
for treating hypothetical choice as relevant to such a concern. But
there is another way of understanding the concern, according to which
what matters is not only the actual causal sequence, but also what
would have happened had the unchosen circumstance not occurred.
This second interpretation is at least as plausible a reading, if not a
more plausible reading, of the brute luck egalitarian concern with the
impact of unchosen circumstance. In support of this claim, notice that
it is commonplace, across many areas of morality and law, that the
impacts of offending acts, omissions and circumstances are identified,
at least in part, relative to what would have happened otherwise. In
tort, for example, the liability of a defendant may be assessed in part
by reference to what would have happened had the tort not occurred.
Now, to the extent that brute luck egalitarians ought to interpret
their concern with the impact of unchosen circumstance in terms of
what would have happened otherwise, they ought to treat hypothetical
choices as sometimes bearing on this underlying concern. To see this,
consider again the (unmodified) case of Cautious Albert and Incautious
Albert. In both cases, we will want to say that the disadvantage
experienced by Cautious Albert and the disadvantage experienced
by Incautious Albert are, at least in part, impacts of unchosen
circumstance. For had the natural course of events been otherwise,
and had you not decided not to intervene in the natural course of
events, then the outcomes that the agents now experience might in
both cases not have occurred. This is true regardless of the fact that
Cautious Albert would have chosen intervention whereas Incautious
Albert would have declined intervention. But there is a third respect
in which the disadvantage now experienced by Cautious Albert is the
impact of a further unchosen circumstance, whereas the same cannot be
said – if we understand impact in terms of what would have happened
otherwise – of the disadvantage now experienced by Incautious Albert.
For the disadvantage now experienced by Cautious Albert is also partly
the impact of the unchosen circumstance that Cautious Albert was
unable either to express to you his preference for intervention or to
intervene in the natural course of events himself. Had he been able
to express his preference for intervention, or to intervene himself,
he might not have suffered a worsening of his visual impairment.
Hypothetical Choice and Egalitarianism 233
In the former case, where Cautious Albert is able to express his
preference for intervention but not to intervene himself, it is reasonable
to assume that, all other things being equal, you would have acted
on the basis of Cautious Albert’s preference. The assumption about
how you would have acted in the former case is warranted because it
is plausible that, as discussed above, the risk-regarding preferences
of agents make a difference to how we should treat them, and it is
reasonable to suppose that knowledge of this fact would have caused
you to choose differently had you known Cautious Albert’s preference.
Moreover, even if one doubts that knowledge of Cautious Albert’s
preference would – or should – have affected your choice, it remains
the case that Cautious Albert’s disadvantage is also partly the impact
of the unchosen circumstance that he was unable to intervene in the
natural course of events himself. Whether or not knowledge of Albert’s
preference would have affected your choice, it is certainly reasonable
to suppose that, all other things being equal, had Cautious Albert been
able to intervene himself, he would have acted on the basis of his
preference for intervention. On the other hand, the same cannot be
said of Incautious Albert, who would still have suffered a worsening
of his visual impairment even if he had been able to express his
preference for non-intervention and if you had acted on the basis of that
preference, or if it had been Incautious Albert himself who was in the
position to intervene but declined to do so.33 In this respect, then, the
disadvantage that Cautious Albert experiences is, to a greater extent
than the disadvantage that Incautious Albert experiences, the impact
of unchosen circumstance.34
In the present section I have argued for two claims. First, I have
argued that the hypothetical choice view is intuitively plausible.
Second, I have argued that the hypothetical choice view can be regarded
as an expression of the underlying brute luck egalitarian concern with
the impact of unchosen circumstance. The case for the hypothetical
33 If we understand counterfactuals in terms of possible worlds, my claim is that of the
possible worlds in which Incautious Albert is able to choose for himself, the closest such
possible world to the actual world (in which Incautious Albert is not able to choose for
himself) is one in which Incautious Albert suffers a worsening of his visual impairment
because he chooses non-intervention.My claim is not that of any possible world other than
the actual one, the closest possible world to the actual world is one in which Incautious
Albert is able to choose for himself. The former claim is plausible. The latter is not.
34 Arneson assumes, but does not develop, something like the present position in a brief
argument directed against Brian Barry’s equal opportunity principle. Arneson writes
that ‘If I was bound and determined not to take an umbrella to the picnic in any case,
my claim to compensation from society due to losses I suffer when rain spoils my picnic
is not enhanced if in fact there was no umbrella available for me to take, given that the
umbrella option would have had no impact on events in any case.’ See R. J. Arneson, ‘Does
Social Justice Matter? Brian Barry’s Applied Political Philosophy’, Ethics 117 (2007),
pp. 391–412, at 399.
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choice view does not depend on the second claim, although, as I noted
above, it is certainly strengthened by it.
V. HOW THE HYPOTHETICAL CHOICE VIEW AVOIDS THE
SEPARATENESS OF PERSONS OBJECTION
The hypothetical choice view can accommodate the intuition that
it is permissible to choose non-intervention in Voorhoeve and
Fleurbaey’s Two-Person Intrapersonal case, but not in their Two-Person
Interpersonal case. To see how it does so, consider in turn the various
risks faced by Albert and Bob in the two cases. First, consider the risks
faced by Albert and Bob in the intrapersonal case. Bob does not face
any risk in this scenario. Whether or not you intervene, Bob’s visual
impairment will remain unchanged. Albert, on the other hand, will face
a risk of disadvantage if you choose non-intervention. He will face the
risk that his visual impairment will worsen, though he will also have
a chance of becoming fully sighted. In the absence of any information
to the contrary, it is reasonable to assume that, if Albert could exercise
choice about the matter, then he would not decline to face the risk
associated with non-intervention. Such an assumption is warranted
because the expected utility of non-intervention is, for Albert, higher
than the expected utility of intervention.35
Now consider the interpersonal case. In this scenario, if you choose
non-intervention, then Bob will stand a chance of becoming fully
sighted, with no possibility of disadvantage on his part. Albert, on
the other hand, will face the risk that his visual impairment might
become worse, with no possibility of improvement. In the absence of
any information to the contrary (such as extreme altruism towards
Bob on Albert’s part36), it is reasonable to suppose that Albert would
decline to face this risk if he were able to choose to do so.
35 If we adopt a Von Neumann–Morgenstern measure of utility, and if you know
that Albert has informed, ideally rational, self-interested preferences, then you can do
better than assume that Albert would choose non-intervention over intervention. In that
case, you can know that, because the utility of non-intervention is higher than that of
intervention, it is true as amatter of definition that Albert would choose (or at least would
prefer) non-intervention over intervention. But even if those conditions don’t obtain, the
reasonable assumption nevertheless suffices to justify non-intervention.
36 Even then, onemight doubt whether a hypothetical choice grounded in such altruism
should justify treating the disadvantage as less bad than it would otherwise have
been. For discussion of the role of altruism in brute luck egalitarianism, see N. Eyal,
‘Egalitarian Justice and Innocent Choice’, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
2 (2007), pp. 1–18; Z. Stemplowska, ‘Making Justice Sensitive to Responsibility’,
Political Studies 57 (2009), pp. 237–59, at 244–5; S. Olsaretti, ‘Responsibility and the
Consequences of Choice’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (2009), pp. 165–88,
at 180–1.
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Overall, then, it is reasonable to suppose that Albert would not
decline to face the risk of being disadvantaged by non-intervention
in the intrapersonal case, but that Albert would decline to face the risk
of being disadvantaged by non-intervention in the interpersonal case.
As such, according to the hypothetical choice view, non-intervention
would lead to disadvantage in the interpersonal case that would be in
one, in this case decisive, way expectably worse than the disadvantage
generated by non-intervention in the intrapersonal case. This is
because, in the interpersonal case, non-intervention would involve
exposing an agent, Albert, to a risk of disadvantage that one could
reasonably expect that hewould decline if hewere able to do so, whereas
in the intrapersonal case, non-intervention would not involve exposing
an agent to a risk of disadvantage that one would reasonably expect
him to decline.
Notice that, in defending the claim that the hypothetical choice view
can accommodate the difference between Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey’s
intrapersonal case and their interpersonal case, I have discussed only
the bearing of Albert’s hypothetical choices about risk on the badness of
Albert’s disadvantage. But, one might object, in the interpersonal case
it is also the case that Bob, unlike Albert, would not have declined the
risk: ought this fact not also make a difference to the badness of Albert’s
disadvantage? If so, then the hypothetical choice viewmight be forced to
say that Albert’s disadvantage is, after all, noworse in the interpersonal
case than in the intrapersonal case, and therefore to leave unanswered
the separateness of persons objection. Nor can brute luck egalitarians
simply respond that Albert’s hypothetical choices bear on the badness of
Albert’s disadvantage or advantage, whereas Bob’s hypothetical choices
bear on the badness of Bob’s disadvantage or advantage, but that the
hypothetical choices of one agent do not bear on the badness of another
agent’s disadvantage or advantage. This is because the egalitarian
focus on comparative disadvantage and advantage, or inequality,means
that, as discussed in section III above, brute luck egalitarians cannot
simply separate out Albert’s and Bob’s disadvantage and advantage
in the envisaged way. As Otsuka and Voorhoeve put it, for brute luck
egalitarians, ‘badness inheres in the relational property of some being
less well off than others’: the badness cannot then be separated into
two distinct parcels, one of which is Albert’s and the other of which is
Bob’s.37
There is a problem here, but it is certainly not unique to the
hypothetical choice view, nor to my claim that the hypothetical choice
37 Otsuka and Voorhoeve, ‘Why It Matters That Some Are Worse Off Than Others’,
p. 183.
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view can answer the separateness of persons objection. For it is well
known that brute luck egalitarianism, even in its actual-choice form,
needs somehow to accommodate the fact that an inequality-generating
event might have been chosen by one agent affected by the inequality
but not chosen by another agent affected by the inequality.38 One
common way that brute luck egalitarians try to avoid this problem
– which I have implicitly adopted in the present article – is to focus
on the choices, and by extension the hypothetical choices, of those who
are disadvantaged (rather than advantaged) by a particular risk that
disadvantages some and advantages others. Another option would be
to say that the badness of disadvantage resulting from risk depends
partly on how many of the agents affected by the inequality chose, or
would not have declined, to face the risk. Both of these formulations face
difficulties, and I believe that it is, for the time being at least, an open
question whether or not either of them, or some other formulation,
can succeed. But if either of the formulations does succeed, then
Bob’s hypothetical choice in the interpersonal trade-off case would
not pose a problem for my claim that the hypothetical choice view
can answer the separateness of persons objection, because on neither
formulation would Bob’s hypothetical choice in the interpersonal trade-
off case prevent the hypothetical choice view from treating Albert’s
potential disadvantage as worse in the interpersonal case than in the
intrapersonal case. On the other hand, if they do not succeed, and if no
other formulation can be supplied which accommodates the fact that
an inequality-generating event might have been chosen by one agent
affected by the inequality but not chosen by another agent affected
by the inequality, then brute luck egalitarianism is already in very
deep water, even before the separateness of persons objection makes
an entrance. Notice that Bob’s hypothetical choice in the interpersonal
trade-off case would not raise any of these difficulties for a hypothetical
choice version of prioritarianism. The disadvantage with which such a
view is concerned is not comparative, so it would be much easier for
such a view to say that only Albert’s hypothetical choice, and not also
Bob’s hypothetical choice, is relevant to the badness of the disadvantage
that Albert stands to suffer in the interpersonal trade-off case.
38 For example, G. A. Cohen, ‘Fairness and Legitimacy in Justice, and: Does Option
Luck ever Preserve Justice?’, in G. A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice,
and Other Essays in Political Philosophy, ed. M. Otsuka (Princeton, 2011), pp. 124–44,
at 143; D. Miller, ‘The Incoherence of Luck Egalitarianism’, University of Oxford CSSJ
Working Papers Series, SJ022 (2014).
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VI. CHILDREN
One might agree that there is sometimes a role for hypothetical choice
in fixing the badness of disadvantage, but deny that hypothetical choice
plays any role in fixing the badness of disadvantage in Voorhoeve
and Fleurbaey’s examples. One might so deny because, in Voorhoeve
and Fleurbaey’s examples, Albert and Bob are both children. Along
similar lines, Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey endorse the thought in Otsuka
and Voorhoeve’s earlier article that, because the rational capacities of
(young) children are underdeveloped, and because their preferences
are ill-informed, ‘there is no reason to defer to whatever wishes [they]
may have out of respect for [their] autonomy’.39 The hypothetical choice
view does not claim that we should defer to agents’ wishes out of respect
for their autonomy: it makes a claim about the bearing of hypothetical
choices on the badness of disadvantage, which the autonomy view does
not make, and the hypothetical choice view need not appeal to the value
of autonomy to justify its claim, as described above. Nevertheless, one
might think that the fact that the agents are children militates not
only against deferring to their wishes out of respect for autonomy, but
also against treating their choices and hypothetical choices as relevant
to the evaluation of disadvantage in the manner recommended by the
hypothetical choice view. If that is the case, then the hypothetical choice
view may not after all be able to render egalitarianism compatible with
intuitions about the moral relevance of interpersonal boundaries in
these and other cases involving children.
I think that the concern about children is overstated. For one thing,
we might ask what justifies Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey’s stipulations
about Albert’s and Bob’s levels of advantage in various situations if not
facts about their preferences. To be sure, Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey do
not themselves insist that Albert’s and Bob’s levels of advantage ought
to be measured by reference to an actual-preference-based measure
of utility, but it is nevertheless commonly thought that preferences
ought to play an important role in measuring levels of advantage,
and Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey do not argue against the use of such a
measure in the case of children. For another thing, we do commonly hold
children responsible for some of their choices at least, even though we
may suspect that the preferences on which those choices are based are
not all that well formed. Indeed, one of the main reasons that we do so
is precisely to facilitate children’s development into responsible agents,
by encouraging them to take seriously their role as choice-bearers by
developing better-formed preferences. I grant, however, that such a
39 Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey, ‘Egalitarianism and the Separateness of Persons’, p. 384;
Otsuka and Voorhoeve, ‘Why It Matters That Some Are Worse Off Than Others’, p. 88.
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response might not be applicable to cases like the present one, in which
particularly severe consequences are at stake.
Even if we should not treat the hypothetical choices of children as
bearing on the badness of disadvantage they suffer, there is an obvious
way in which the hypothetical choice view could be modified slightly to
accommodate examples involving children. For consider that, where we
do think that children’s preferences ought not to be foregrounded, the
moral role that would normally be played by choices and preferences in
the case of adults is instead played by interests in the case of children
(or perhaps, not dissimilarly, by assumptions about what rational
guardians would choose for their charges). Onemight therefore develop
a view according to which disadvantage in the case of children is worse
when it results from a risk that it was expectably damaging to the self-
interest of the children affected, considered individually, to be exposed
to, than when it results from a risk that it was not expectably damaging
to the self-interest of the children affected, considered individually, to
be exposed to (or when a rational guardian with his or her charge’s
interests in mind would have declined to expose his or her charge to
the risk). Such a view can explain the difference in our intuitions about
the two-person intrapersonal case and the two-person interpersonal
case, even if the fact that Albert and Bob are children renders their
hypothetical choices irrelevant to an evaluation of the badness of
their disadvantage. It can do so because non-intervention is expectably
damaging to Albert’s interests in the two-person interpersonal case,
but expectably damaging to neither agent’s interests in the two-person
intrapersonal case. Note that the justification for such a view would not
appeal to hypothetical choices of children or to the value of autonomy,
since the view does not suppose that the children will prefer that which
is in their interests. Rather the justification would be something like
the thought that, if you have a pro tanto duty not to do something which
you know will be expectably damaging to a child’s interests, considered
individually (or which a rational guardian would have declined for their
charge), then all other things being equal the disadvantage that a child
suffers as a result of your acting contrary to that duty is worse than
it would have been had you chosen in a way that was in conformity
with the duty. This could be true even if your choice was all things
considered permissible or even required as a result of competing duties
to other children, whose interests may also have been at stake in your
decision.40
40 Note that neither the interests view nor the hypothetical choice of guardians view
is threatened by Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey’s ‘Principle of Full Information’, according
to which you should not rank options based on agents’ ex ante interests, or based on
what guardians who do not know which outcome will eventuate would choose for their
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VII. CONCLUSION
Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey charge that brute luck egalitarians, in
common with utilitarians and prioritarians, cannot accommodate
intuitions about the moral relevance of interpersonal boundaries.
Such intuitions are exemplified by the difference in the intuitive
permissibility of non-intervention in their Two-Person Intrapersonal
case and their Two-Person Interpersonal case. In response to this
challenge, I have argued that brute luck egalitarians can accommodate
intuitions about the moral relevance of interpersonal boundaries by
endorsing the hypothetical choice view, which claims that hypothetical
choices about risk play a role in fixing the badness of disadvantage.
Such a view, I argued, is not ad hoc, but is plausible independently of
its ability to answer the separateness of persons objection. I also noted
that those who are drawn to prioritarianism might likewise endorse a
version of their view that is sensitive to hypothetical choices. I argued
that, even if the hypothetical choice view does not apply in cases
involving children, nevertheless a modified version of the view can
still accommodate intuitions about the separateness of persons in such
cases. Of course the hypothetical choice view still confronts many of the
objections that have been posed against existing formulations of brute
luck egalitarianism, including the worry that brute luck egalitarianism
cannot accommodate the fact that an inequality-generating event
might have been chosen by one affected agent but not chosen by
another affected agent, and its shift in focus away from actual choice
doubtless invites new objections. Those who are especially exercised
by such objections will not be persuaded by the hypothetical choice
view. Nevertheless, others will be more troubled by the difficulties that
alternative responses to the separateness of persons objection face – by,
for example, Wasserman’s worries about the ex ante view, and by the
acknowledged incompleteness of the competing claims view. For these
readers, the hypothetical choice view offers an attractive explanation of
the intuitions to which Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey direct our attention.41
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charges, if for any possible outcome you would rank the options differently if you knew
what the outcome was going to be. They are not threatened because, as Fleurbaey and
Voorhoeve themselves grant, the Principle of Full Information does not apply when, as in
the present cases, one would rank the outcomes differently depending on which outcome
occurs. A. Voorhoeve and M. Fleurbaey, ‘Decide as You Would with Full Information!
An Argument against ex ante Pareto’, Inequalities in Health: Concepts, Measures, and
Ethics, ed. N. Eyal, S. Hurst, O. Norheim and D. Wikler (Oxford, 2013), pp. 113–28.
41 I am grateful to Alex Voorhoeve and an anonymous referee for comments on a
previous version of this article, and to the AHRC for funding the research.
